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SAFETY PROGRAM OVERVIEW
In FY 1991, the NASA Safety Division continued efforts to enhance the quality and
productivity of its safety oversight function. Recent initiatives set forth in areas such as
training, risk management, safety assurance, operational safety, and safety information
systems have matured into viable programs contributing to the safety and success of
activities throughout the Agency.
Efforts continued to develop a centralized intra-agency safety training program with
establishment of the NASA Safety Training Center at the Johnson Space Center (JSC).
The objective is to provide quality training for NASA employees and contractors on a broad
range of safety-related topics. Courses developed by the Training Center will be presented
at various NASA locations to minimize travel and reach the greatest number of people at
the least cost. In FY 1991, as part of the ongoing efforts to enhance the total quality of
NASA's safety workforce, the Safety Training Center initiated development of a Certified
Safety Professional review course. This course provides a comprehensive review of the
skills and knowledge that well-rounded safety professionals must possess to qualify for
professional certification. FY 1992 will see the course presented to NASA and contractor
employees at all installations via the NASA Video Teleconference System.
The Safety Division developed a Managers Safety Training course. The purpose of the
course is to familiarize NASA managers with their responsibilities in complying with OSHA
and NASA safety requirements. The course was piloted at the Lewis Research Center
(LeRC), Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Stennis
Space Center (SSC), Wallops Flight Facility (WFF), and JSC. The course materials are
now available for tailoring and presentation by the Installations' safety and health staffs.
Safety has been integrated into the NASA Program/Project Managers course sponsored by
the Headquarters Training Division. One course module, covering a wide range of safety
topics, is presented by the Director of the NASA Safety Division. Another module is
dedicated to risk management. A NASA Explosive Safety Orientation course was
developed and piloted at JSC and KSC. The Safety Division also sponsored the
development of a NASA Management Oversight and Risk Tree Analysis Accident
Investigation course introduced in FY 1991 at JSC.
Independent safety assurance was provided for 8 Space Shuttle launches, 3 Expendable
Launch Vehicles, and 64 payloads. Safety assurance efforts include a Mission Safety
Evaluation (MSE) for each Space Shuttle launch. The MSE report contains a certified
independent assessment and status of significant mission risks, including acceptance
rationale.
A NASA Safety Steering Committee Meeting was held on January 23 through 25, 1991, in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. Representatives from all NASA Centers were in attendance
to discuss overall NASA safety efforts and to gain insight into the total safety program.
Some of the major topics were "Safety 2000" (the Safety Division's strategic plan), revision
of the NASA Basic Safety Manual, safety training, survey trends, and safety program
organizational changes.
NASA continued its initiatives to control trends,major causesor sourcesof fatalities, and
lost time disabilities, and to lower overall compensationcosts. The Safety Division sets
annual lost time injury/illness frequencyrate goals for each Center. The goals are based
on a number of parameters including previous performance as compared to the Center's
own pastrecord and to the overall Agencyrate, improvementdesired,and projected worker
hours. This effort is part of an overall safetymotivation program that strives to continually
reduce injuries in the workplace.
The Safety Division has established an excellent working relationship with OSHA via
periodic meetingswith OSHA's Office of Federal AgencyPrograms.Topics coveredduring
these meetings include the extent of safety training available from the OSHA Training
Institute, collateral duty safetytraining, early notification of pending new OSHA safetyand
health requirements,participation in Federal Safety Councils, proposed Memorandum of
Understanding between OSHA and NASA establishingprotocols for abatement of cited
deficiencies, and proposed establishment of a safety and health professional exchange
program.
A major accomplishmentin FY 1991wascompletion of the NASA Alternate Standardfor
Suspended__Load. Crane Operation s. This extensive effort required coordination between
NASA Headquarters, the Kennedy Space Center, and OSHA national, regional and area
offices. The standard was approved by the Department of Labor's Assistant Secretary for
Occupat[onaI safety and Health.
NASA part_ipaied_in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Drunk and
Drugged Driver Awakeness Campa[gnand the "70% Plus FederaI Employees Safety Belt
Use" program under Executive Order 12566. NASA excelled with eight of nine Installations
achieving a minimum of 70% seat belt utilization ahead of the President's goal of January
1992.
During FY i99i, NASA Safety developed, validated, or revised various new management
issuances policies, handbooks, standards, and other documents. A major effort to revise the
NASA Basic SafetyManua ! continued. A fina ! draft was distributed to the NASA field
installati6nsir6r review and comment. A revised NASA Safety Standard for Lifting Devices
and Equipment was completed. A Management Instruction defining the NASA Safety
Program for Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems was completed and published. An
Aviation Program Management Instruction, which includes extensive safety requirements,
was completed and published. A Management Instruction defining the NASA Emergency
Preparedness Program was published. A NASA Safety Standard for Underwater Facility
and Non-Open Water Operations was completed and published. A Self Audit Safety
Check--st foi'-29_ i96ORequirements was published. Several documents were
drafted/revised_anddistributed to (he field installations for review and comment, including:
(1) draft Hydrogen/Oxygen Safety Handbook, (2) draft Explosive Safety Handbook,
(3) draft NASA Safety and Health Program Management Instruction, (4) draft NASA
Emergency Preparedness Plan, (5) revised NASA Fire Protection Manual, and (6) a form
for Employee Reports of Alleged Hazards.
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The Headquarters Hazardous Substances Internal Coordinating Committee continued to
provide a forum for interdisciplinary discussion among all Headquarters staff concerned
with the health, safety, storage, and transportation of hazardous materials, and the
environmental exposure of the NASA workforce. The committee was active in screening
and assessing the impact of new and proposed regulatory requirements and the need for
related training. Committee meetings have included speakers from OSHA's Office of
Federal Agency Programs.
NASA Safety sponsored a Fire Protection Meeting in Boston on May 23 in conjunction with
the National Fire Protection Association's Annual Meeting.
There were significant efforts to improve and expand NASA's safety information systems
in FY 1991. An upgrade to the NASA Mishap Reporting/Corrective Action System
(MR/CAS) was approved and funded. The new multiuser system will be implemented at
the beginning of FY 1992. Development of a prototype Lessons Learned Information
System was initiated. This automated database will be a valuable tool for use by safety
personnel, program managers, and engineers throughout NASA. The Safety Division is
also developing an Automated NASA Safety Training Catalog. A demonstration prototype
was completed in FY 1991. This automated database will provide NASA and contractor
personnel instant access to information on safety related courses available throughout the
Agency.
The Safety Division continued to participate in the Headquarters SRM&QA Survey
Program. All NASA field installations are being surveyed on a 2-year cycle. As part of this
effort, the safety programs at Ames Research Center/Dryden Flight Research Facility
(ARC/DFRF), Langley Research Center (LaRC), and LeRC were reviewed in FY 1991.
The Centers are required to take corrective action on all discrepancies found during the
surveys. Lessons learned as a result of the surveys are distributed throughout the Agency
so that all may benefit. The Safety Division conducted a special survey of the Headquarters
facility to help management assess the posture of the safety program and to make
recommendations for program enhancements.
NASA will continue to strive for maximum safety awareness and excellence in all activities.
The field installations and the Safety Division will continue to work together to maintain
an emphasis on safety.
Leven B. Gray -')
Acting Director, Safety Division
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FY 1991 NASA SAFETY STATISTICS
Fatalities
NASA Safety
Reportable Injuries/Illnesses
No-Lost Time
Lost Time
Total Cases
259
94
353
Costs
Lost Wages
Chargeback Billing
Material Losses
Total Losses
$141,223
$6,012,193
$6.127.578
$i2_280,994
Information on injuries/illnesses and material' losses was 0btained from the NASA Mishap
Reporting/Corrective Action System (MR/CAS). Lost wages and chargeback billing figures
are from the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP).
NASA OCCUPATIONAL INJURY/ILLNESS RECORD
Injuries and illness are d_vided into lost time cases and no-lost time cases. As defined by
OSHA, a recordable (i.e., compensable) lost time case is a work related incident that results
in either a nonfatal, traumatic injury that causes loss of time from work or disability beyond
the day or shift when the injury occurred, or a nonfatal illness/diseas e that causes loss of
time from work or disability at any time. A no-lost time case is a nonfatal injury
(traumatic) or illness/disease (nontraumatic) requiring medical treatment beyond first aid
but does not result in lost time. NASA Safety organizations adhere to the OSHA reporting
guidelines with some exceptions. For example, NASA Safety does not consider restricted
duty or time taken for medical treatment to be lost time. Also, instances of injuries
sustained during recreational activities Or in parking lots during non-work-related activities
are not included in the MR/CAS.
? ....
Table 1 shows the FY i991 NASA Safety reportable injury/illness statistics for Federal
employees at NASA Centers and for contractor employees at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(JPL). (JPL is government owned and contractor operated for the purpose of research and
development.) The NASA Safety Division calculates injury/illness frequency rates based
on the actual hours worked by each employee. The overall lost time frequency rate of 0.42
for NASA Federal employees is an 11% increase from the FY 1990 rate of 0.38. The lost
time frequency rate of 0.87 for JPL contractor employees is a 20% decrease from the FY
1990 rate of 1.09.
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Figure 1 shows how the FY 1991 NASA Safety reportable lost time injury/illness frequency
rates for Federal employees at NASA Centers compare to the Centers' individual goals set
by the Safety Division, the overall NASA goal of 0.40, and the overall FY 1991 NASA rate
of 0.42. Although NASA did not meet its overall goal for FY 1991, six of the nine centers
did meet their individual goals.
Figure 2 plots the NASA Safety reportable lost time frequency rate, no-lost time rate, and
the total rate. Prior to FY 1989, the number of reported no-lost time cases was on the
decline, and in FY 1988, actually f¢!! below the number of lost time cases. This trend was
reversed in FY 19891 and since that time, the number of no-lost time cases_ has increased
every year. The primary reasons identified for this reversal are the significant increase in
activity since 1988 and the establishment of health/first aid clinics at the Centers, resulting
in !ncrease d reporting_ and treatment of minor no-lost time injuries/illnesses.
Figure 3 compares the FY 1991 NASA Safety reportable lost time frequency rates of NASA
Federal employees at each Center with the previous year's rate and an average rate for the
previous 3 years (FY 1988 - FY 1990).
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Comparison of NASA's injury/illness performance to that of other government agencies and
private industries can be made using the injury/illness incidence rates published by the
Department of Labor. Figures 4, 5, and 6 reflect these rates which are based on OWCP
data and determined according to the number of injury/illness cases per 100 employees.
The incidence rate for NASA is usually slightly higher than the frequency rate calculated
by the NASA Safety Division. This is due to inherent differences in the two formulas and
variations in the OWCP data. (OWCP tracks the number of claims made on OSHA
recordable injuries and illnesses. It is possible for more than one claim to be made as the
result of a given injury or illness.)
Figure 4 illustrates the relative position of NASA's lost time injury/illness performance
Compared to that of other Federal agencies having more than i5,000 employees in FY 1990
and FY 1991. Within this group of Federal agencies, NASA has ranked second since
FY 1984_
Figure 5 compares NASA's lost time injury/illness performance for the last 11 years against
that of other Federal agencies and select private sector industries. NASA's rates have been
consistently lower than those of the Federal Government and the private sector. The most
recent statistics available from the Department of Labor for the private sector are for
FY 1990.
Figure 6 illustrates NASA's excellent overall injury/illness record over the last 11 years as
compared to all other Federal agencies, the private sector, private sector manufacturing
industry, and the private sector aerospace industry. The most recent statistics available
from the Department of Labor for the private sector are for FY 1990.
i
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LOST TIME INJURY/ILLNESS RATES
IN SELECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES"
DEPT. OF STATE
[ NASA
DEPT. OF ENERGY
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U.S. POSTAL SERVICE
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CHARGEBACK BILLING
Chargeback is defined by OSHA as a system under which the U.S. Department of Labor
pays compensation and medical costs attributed to injuries that occurred after
December i, i960, and then bills the agency that employed the individual who received
compensation or benefits. In any given year, most of the chargeback billing is a result of
illnesses and injuries that occurred in previous years. Only 2.6%, or $153,762, of the
chargeback billing costs paid in FY 1991 were for injuries that actually occurred during that
year.
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between chargeback billing and all other mishap and
injury-related costs. These costs include lost wages (continuation of pay) as well as damage
to or loss of NASA property in excess of $499. Of the $12.3 million total loss for FY 1991,
$6.0 million, or 49%, was paid out in chargeback billing costs.
Figure 8 illustrates the trend of chargeback billing in the Federal Government and in NASA
for the last 11 years. The Federal Government's chargeback billing costs have continued
to increase each year. NASA's stabilized at around $5 million annually through 1989 but
increased to $6.0 million in FY 1990 and remained there in FY 1991.
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MATERIAL LOSSES
Tables 2A and 2B list the statistics for NASA material losses during FY 1991. Indirect
costs associated with cleanup, investigation, injuries, or shutdown of operations are not
included in these statistics. Table 2A provides the number of equipment/property damage
cases by equipment classification for each installation. Table 2B provides the cost of
equipment/property damage cases by equipment classification for each installation.
Figure 9 illustrates the total costs of material losses over the last 11 years.
Figure 10 provides a percentage breakdown of equipment/property costs for FY 1991.
Facility and flight hardware losses were the major contributors.
Figure 11 compares FY 1991 equipment/property costs with FY 1990 results. Significant
decreases in flight hardware, facility, and ground support equipment losses resulted in a
32% decrease in the total cost of material losses between FY 1990 and FY 1991.
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NASA MISHAP DEFINITIONS
The revised NASA Management Instruction for Mishap Reporting and Investigation
(NMI 8621.1E), dated September 6, 1988, contains updated NASA mishap definitions. All
mishaps reported in FY 1991 were categorized according to these definitions as follows:
. NASA MISHAP: Any unplanned occurrence, event, or anomaly that meets one of
the definitions below. Injury to a member of the public while on NASA facilities
also is defined as a NASA mishap.
a.
b.
TYPE A MISHAP: A mishap causing death and/or damage to equipment
or property equal to or greater than $1,000,000. Mishaps resulting in damage
to aircraft or space hardware, i.e., flight and ground support hardware,
meeting this criterion are included. This definition also appl!es to a test
failure if the damage was unexpected or unanticipated or if the failure is
likely to have significant program impact or visibility.
C.
do
e.
TYPE B MISHAP: A mishap resulting in permanent disability to one or more
persons, or hospitalization (for other that observation) of five or more
persons, and/or damage to equipment or property equal to or greater than
$250,000 but less than $1,000,000. Mishaps resulting in damage to aircraft or
space hardware which meet this criterion are included, as are test failures
where the damage was unexpected or unanticipated.
TYPE C MISHAP" A mishap resulting in damage to equipment or property
equal to or greater than $25,000 but less than $250,000, and/or causing
occupational injury or illness that results in a lost workday case. Mishaps
resulting in damage to aircraft or space hardware which meet this criterion
are included, as are test failures where the damage was unexpected or
unanticipated ......
MIS-SIO_N FAILURE' Any mishap (event) of such a serious nature that it
prevents accomplishment of a majority of the primary mission objectives. A
mishap of whatever intrinsic severity that, in the judgment of the Program
Associate Administrator, in coordination with the Associate Administrator for
Safety and Mission Quality, prevents the achievement of primary mission
objectives as described in the Mission Operations Report or equivalent
dOCument.
INCIDENT: A mishap consisting of less than Type C severity of injury to
personnel (more than first aid severity) and/or property damage equal to or
greater than $1,000 but less than $25,000.
22
. NASA CONTRACTOR MISHAP: Any mishaps as defined in paragraphs la through
le that involve only NASA contractor personnel, equipment, or facilities in support
of NASA operations.
. IMMEDIATELY REPORTABLE MISHAPS: All mishaps that require immediate
telephonic notification to local and Headquarters safety officials. Included in this
category are those mishaps defined in paragraphs la through ld and 2 with the
exception of Type C injury/illness cases and incidents.
. CLOSE CALL: An occurrence in which there is no injury, no significant
equipment/property damage (less than $1,000), and no significant interruption of
productive work, but which possesses a high potential for any of the mishaps as
defined in paragraphs la through le.
. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA)
RECORDABLE MISHAP: An occupational death, injury, or illness that must be
recorded subject to OSHA requirements in 29 CFR Part 1960 and Part 1910.
. COSTS: Direct costs of repair, retest, program delays, replacement, or recovery of
NASA materials including hours, material, and contract costs, but excluding indirect
costs of cleanup, investigation (either by NASA, contractor, or consultant), injury,
and by normal operational shutdown. Materials or equipment replaced by another
organization at no cost to NASA will be calculated at "book" value. This includes
those mishaps covered by insurance.
23
MISHAP STATISTICS
Tables 3 and 4 show the mishaps that were reported by the NASA field installations as
having significance beyond the minor dollar losses or no-lost time injury category. These
mishaps provide lessons learned for all NASA accident prevention programs.
Figure 12 presents an ll-year overview of all NASA Type A and B mishaps and Type C
property damage mishaps. Type B and C personal injuries are reflected in Table 1. The
dollar limits for each category have escalated over the years due to inflation and policy
changes.
Figure i3 presents an 11-year history of NASA's total losses from chargeback billing costs,
lost wages, and material losses due to mishaps.
Tabl- es 5A and:5B provide asafety performanCe:summary for FY i99i: Table :5A shows
the incidents with injury rates for NASA employees at each Center and compares FY 1991
lost time injury/illness rates with each Center's goal and previous performance. Table 5B
shows the number and type of mishaps and the cost of material losses for FY 1990 and
FY 1991.
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MAJOR MISHAPS IN FY 1991
FATALITY
AMES RESEARCH CENTER
TYPE A
On February 1, 1991, a NASA employee from the Ames Dryden Flight Research Facility
was killed in a commercial airline accident at the Los Angeles International Airport while
traveling on Agency business. She was one of ten passengers on a SkyWest twin-engine
Fairchild Metroliner III commuter plane that was preparing for take off when it was struck
by a USAir Boeing 737 that was in the process of landing. The National Transportation
Safety Board investigated the mishap.
FATALITY
JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
TYPE A
On April 5, 1991, Astronaut Captain Manley L. "Sonny" Carter was killed in a commercial
airline accident in Georgia while traveling on government business. He was one of 23
people on an Atlantic Southeast Airline Brazilian-made Embraer 120 twin-engine turboprop
commuter plane on route from Atlanta to Brunswick. The plane crashed in a wooded area
approximately 3 miles from its destination, the Glynco Jetport. There were no survivors.
The National Transportation Safety Board investigated the mishap.
Captain Carter was a Navy officer who flew aboard the Space Shuttle Discovery on a
Department of Defense mission (STS-33) in November 1989 and was scheduled to fly
aboard the International Microgravity Lab-1 mission (STS-42).
FUEL CELL MISHAP
KENNEDY SPACE CENTER
TYPE A
On August ]2, _1991, two of the three fuel cells installed on Orbiter Atlanti s, OV-I04, were
damaged when they were inadvertently left connected to the Orbiter's main electrical power
busses without water removal capability. The accumulation of water can cause severe
damage to the fuel cells.
Atlantis landed at KSC on August 11, 1991 after completing the STS-43 mission. The
vehicle was undergoing deservice and sating operations in the Orbiter Processing Facility
(OPF) High Bay 2 as part of the turnaround activities for its next mission, STS-44. As the
result of an inadequate test procedure, helium was inadvertently ingested into the fuel cell
oxygen supply. Ingestion of helium does not harm the fuel cells, but it does degrade
performance. In this case, it initiated a sequence of events that resulted in damage to the
fuel cells. The decrease in power necessitated the implementation of an emergency power
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down procedure. This procedure consisted of 6 crew module switch actions and was
believed to have electrically isolated the fuel cells from the Orbiter's main busses.
However, the procedure did not addressthe loss of multiple fuel cells with no vehicle
ground power, as was the case. There wasno power available to drive the fuel cell main
bus motor switches to the open (isolate) position. Unknowingly, the fuel cells were left
connected to the Orbiter's main electrical power busses. The chemical reaction within the
fuel cells continued to generate electrical power and water for 16 hours and 36 minutes
before reports of occasional alarms and noises (e.g., fans operating) emanating from the
Orbiter led to the realization that the fuel cells were still connected to the Orbiter's main
busses. The fuel cells were removed from the busses at approximately 8:34 p.m. EDT
August 12, 1991, by use of ground power through the Orbiter ground umbilicals. Final
cost of the mishap was $2,575,000.
FIRE
MODULAR BUILDING
AMES RESEARCH CENTER
TYPE B
On December 5, 1990, a fire occurred at approximately 12:45 a.m. at the Ames Research
Center in a modular building where research in microwave landing systems was being
conducted.
The fire started in one of the building's four heat pump units. Sawdust in an improperly
installed duct connector was exposed to the heat pump's furnace electric coils. Once the
sawdust was ignited, the fire spread to the wood framing and paper backed insulation in the
walls. Most of the fire damage occurred above the suspended ceiling. Heat, water, and
smoke damage was sustained throughout the building including the various computers and
test equipment. Final cost of the damage to property and equipment was $600,000.
PROPELLER TEST RIG
AMES RESEARCH CENTER
TYPE B
A mishap occurred in the 40 × 80 Foot Wind Tunnel on March 27, 1991, at approximately
6:30 p.m. It was caused by the failure of a bearing set in the collective pitch control system
of the Propeller Test Rig (PTR). A three-bladed propeller rotor, 25-feet in diameter, was
being tested at the time of the failure.
Failure of the bearing set occurred in several stages, allowing the collective pitch tube to
progressively move forward, causing decreased pitch. Rotor torque went from about 10,000
foot-pounds to -2,000 foot-pounds. At that point, the rotor control system locked up as
designed to prevent PTR damage. It was recognized there was a problem and the breaker
for the model motors was opened. (Opening the breaker had been successful during a
previous incident, and it was thought that this was a similar event.) It was unknown that
the rotor blades had gone to a lower blade angle. As soon as the breaker was opened, the
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rotor beganto accelerate. Redlineswere rapidly indicated and a Wind Tunnel Emergency
Stop was initiated. Unfortunately, the failure had progressed too far, and the rotor
continued to accelerateuntil it self-destructeddue to overspeed. One blade tore loose
and lodged in the top of the test section. The remaining rotor and mast assemblytore
loose from the model drive systemdue to imbalance. The rotor assemblywent down the
tunnel, coming to rest against a safety fence. Somedebris went past the first fence but
most was collected againsta second. Damagewas limited to the model, PTR, tunnel test
section,and the first safetyfence. The only damageto the tunnel drive wasa small gouge
in one of the blades.
L
The primary cause of the mishap was a design deficiency. The collective tube thrust
bearing set was undersized. The bearing set was selected over 20 years ago; since then
PTR loads have increased threefold. Although the load increase had been recognized,
and the design reviewed twice, the bearing capacity was overlooked both times. A
contributing factor was that the onset of bearing failure could not be detected. Because the
failure went undetected, the emergency procedures taken were not adequate to minimize
damage. Cost of the mishap is estimated at $850,000.
FIRE
PRECIOUS METALS FINISHING SHOP
JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
TYPE B
A fire occurred at approximately 2:40 a,m. on April 5, i991, in the Precious Metals
Finishing Shop at the Johnson Space Center. A 1000-watt quartz heater was unintentionally
left energized in a bucket of water the previous afternoon. The heater was not designed
to shut off automatically if the water dropped below an acceptable level. On_g the water
evaporated, the heater's protective sheath melted and the polypropylene bucket partially
melted and later ignited. A simulation, conducted after the fire, verified the plausibility of
spontaneous ignition under these conditions. Fortunately, the fire was contained to a small
area within the shop. The cost of damage to facilities and equipment was $350,000.
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TYPE C MISHAPS
EQUIPMENT/PROPERTY DAMAGE
Ames Research Center
A NASA aircraft was damaged when it rolled into a tow tug at the Yokota Air Force Base
in Japan. The aircraft was parked with one nose gear chocked when the brakes
inadvertently released. The aircraft began to roll, ejecting the chock. It came to a stop
when it contacted the tow tug. Cost of the mishap was estimated at $55,000.
Jet Propulsion Laboratory_
Several buildings were damaged during an earthquake on June 28, 1991.
damage was estimated to be $155,000.
Cost of the
Johnson Space Flight Center
The right hand engine on NASA aircraft N-946 shut down during a high power checkout.
A visual inspection revealed a hole in the engine. Primary cause of the mishap was
material failure. Final cost of the mishap was $167,600.
NASA aircraft 956 ground aborted a pilot proficiency flight when the left engine failed
immediately following runway lineup power check and selection of afterburner. The failure
was due to foreign object damage to the engine compressor. The primary cause of the
mishap was equipment failure due to lack of proper maintenance. Final cost of the mishap
was $71,684.
Kennedy Space Center
Various power modules in an AC uninterruptible power supply system were burned out
when a contractor installed a new electrical buss duct. The cause was a dead short in the
new buss duct. A shipping bracket was found bolted to the newly installed buss duct
breaker housing. The contractor failed to test the new buss duct prior to energizing it.
Final cost of the mishap was $27,517.
Twenty-two fuel cells were damaged when they were accidentally filled with contaminated
waste during a manufacturing process at a contractor's facility. The contractor was building
a Space Shuttle battery section. The cells were lowered into a tank to be charged with a
hydroxide solution. An operator started the vacuum pump without realizing that a drain
valve to a hazardous waste solution tank was open. The waste backfilled into the fuel cells.
The mishap was attributed to lack of attention by the operator. Final cost of the mishap
was $40,000.
Langley Research Center
A 2-dimensional rotorcraft model and the 8-Foot Transonic Pressure Wind Tunnel were
damaged when screws used to attach part of the model's supercritical wing flap failed
during a test. The primary cause of the mishap was equipment failure due to design
deficiency. Final cost of the mishap was $56,500.
33
ILewis Research Center
A service air compressor motor began smoking and broke out in flames. Operators had just
completed running a check on recent repairs to the compressor's aftercooler. The fire
started when they attempted to shut down the machine. The primary cause of the mishap
was found to be equipment failure due to material failure. Final cost of the mishap was
$50,000.
Marshall Space Flight Center
A Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS) rocket engine module (REM) was damaged during a
handling operation. An acoustic test had just been completed on the TOS. A mobile lift
was being moved into position to remove plastic sheeting when a railing on the lift caught
the REM, bending a thermal standoff. The primary cause of the mishap was a procedure
deficiency. Contributing factors were poor communications and inadequate task supervision.
Cost of the mishap was estimated at $100,000.
A Centaur stage, donated to the Alabama Space and Rocket Center (ASROC) for display,
was damaged when it struck an overpass during transport from General Dynamics
Corporation, San Diego, California. The primary cause of the mishap was a deviation from
proper procedures. The escort driver did not have the fiberglass clearance pole properly
secured to avoid wind deflection. Cost of the mishap was estimated at $81,400.
:.. h.
A 300-second shuttle main engine test was cut off when a fire was observed in the fueI tank
pressurant line facility intcrfac_e_ Post-test leak checks revealed a class III leak at a "B" nut
which was loose. This area passed a leak check prior to the test. Damage from heating
was found at 6 engine harnesses and a controller coolant duct bellows. The cause of the
mishap was equipment failure due to material failure. Cost of the mishap was estimated
at $25,000.
The insulation on a 5-kv power line failed resulting in a fire at an electrical substation. The
mishap was caused by equipment failure due to material failure. Final cost of the mishap
was $25,767.
Damage to a Shuttle Main Engine High Pressure Fuel Turb0pump was discoveredafter a
test run was aborted due to high lift-off seal delta pressure. A post-test borescope
inspection revealed debris in the roller bearing compartment. During preparation for the
test, a high pressure blowdown and venting was noted. It is believed that this caused a
dry-spin of the turbopump resulting in the damage. Final cost of the mishap was $107,464.
The insulation in a solid rocket booster segment was damaged when a main film board
being positioned inside the segment contacted the insulation. It was discovered that the air
bearing deck used to support the segment had floated during the procedure, causing the
segment to shift out of alignment, resulting in the damage to the segments insulation. The
insulation was only slightly imprinted, but the segment could not be used in the flight motor
test as scheduled. Final cost of the mishap was $220,000.
Stennis Space Center
A liquid nitrogen vessel cracked while it was being filled. The primary cause of the mishap
was equipment failure due to lack of proper maintenance. Final cost of the mishap was
$87,020.
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